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The expanded use of videotaped evidence is likely to be approved by
courts. The videotape is not an inherently prejudicial medium for presenting a
case.2 In fact, many advantages have been suggested for its increased use.3
Admissibility of videotape evidence should depend on the admissibility of its
component audio and visual aspects. In State v. Mayhue,4 the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District was confronted with difficult evidentiary
objections to the use of videotapes in a criminal case. A videotape depicting a
witness identifying a suspect was held not to be hearsay, cumulative, or preju-
dicial.5 The Mayhue case is significant because it should increase the use of
videotapes in the criminal identification process.
Mayhue and two other men forcibly entered an automobile occupied by
Ronald Fellman and Shardell Super. Fellman was locked in the trunk while
Super was raped. Super was then locked in the trunk. While trying to escape,
Fellman was shot and killed by one of Mayhue's cohorts. Mayhue later opened
the trunk, shot Super, and left her for dead.e
A preindictment lineup was staged and videotaped without counsel pre-
sent.7 A second videotape showed Super viewing the videotaped lineup from
1. 653 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
2. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
4. 653 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
5. Id. at 234-35.
6. 653 S.W.2d at 230. Although the bullet passed through both sides of
Super's face, it did not kill her. Id.
7. Id. This tape will be referred to hereinafter as the first videotape or the
videotaped lineup. On appeal, the only objection to the admission of this tape was that
it violated the sixth amendment right to counsel. See infra note 13 and accompanying
text.
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her hospital bed.8 For approximately ten seconds at the end of the tape, the
camera focused directly on the victim displaying her incapacitation, bandages,
and intravenous tubes.9
At trial, only a small scar remained on Super's face. Prior to showing the
second tape to the jury,'Super testified that she had seen it before and that it
was a fair and accurate representation of her viewing the videotaped lineup.
She further testified that the tape depicted the trio that had committed the
offenses, but she did not identify them by name. Mayhue presented no evi-
dence to impeach this testimony.' 0 The videotapes were introduced and shown
to the jury over Mayhue's objections."
Mayhue was convicted of first degree murder, forcible rape, first degree
robbery, assault, and armed criminal action. 2 On appeal, Mayhue asserted
five contentions. First, Mayhue argued that both tapes violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel.' 3 Second, Mayhue argued that the second tape
was inadmissible as hearsay evidence. Third, Mayhue asserted that this tape
was cumulative and inadmissible to bolster Super's unimpeached testimony.
Fourth, Mayhue claimed that the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to
view the visually gruesome and prejudicial tape of Super. Finally, Mayhue
argued that videotaped evidence is inherently prejudicial in a criminal trial.' 4
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected each of these contentions and affirmed
8. 653 S.W.2d at 230. The audio portion of this tape included statements by
Super regarding the culpability of each defendant. These statements were struck by the
trial judge because they were hearsay. The only sound presented to the jury was the
recitation of predetermined numbers identifying the suspects. Id. at 233.
9. Telephone interview with Carrie Franke, Assistant Prosecutor in Mayhue
(September 18, 1983).
10. 653 S.W.2d at 230.
11. Id. Although the Mayhue court purported to review the case as "plain er-
ror," Mayhue apparently objected to the second tape at trial at least on hearsay and
prejudice grounds. A videotaped confession was also displayed to the jury, but Mayhue
raised no argument concerning this tape on appeal. Id.
12. Id. at 229.
13. Mayhue contended that his right to counsel was denied at both the original
videotaping of the lineup and the subsequent identification by the victim. The trial
court correctly held that there is no right to counsel at a lineup staged prior to indict-
ment. Id. at 234; see also State v. Young, 597 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. App., W.D.
1980) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972)). There probably is no right to
counsel at the taping or viewing stage of a post-indictment lineup either. In United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice Stewart declared
that there was no right to counsel at the time the lineup was photographed or when the
victim selected the photograph from a display. The video evidence reconstructs the cir-
cumstances of the display without the necessity of the eyes and ears of counsel. Id. at
324-25. In McMillan v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 239, 265 N.W.2d 553 (1978), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that a videotaped lineup was similar to a photographic display
and did not constitutionally entitle the suspect to have counsel present at either the
taping or viewing stage. Id. at 248, 265 N.W.2d at 556-58. But see Cox v. State, 219
So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1969) (right to counsel at viewing stage if requested after arrest).
14. Mayhue, 653 S.W.2d at 230-31.
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Mayhue argued that the videotape of Super viewing the lineup was hear-
say evidence in that it was an out-of-court declaration introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 6 The prosecution claimed that the tape was simi-
lar to live, direct testimony by a witness that had identified the suspect on a
prior occasion. 17 Mayhue characterized the tape as analogous to the testimony
of a third party concerning identification and circumstances.38 In the alterna-
tive, Mayhue contended that videotapes differ from live prior identification
testimony in that they allow a recreation of the lineup and dramatically appeal
to jurors' emotions.' 9 The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Mayhue's
arguments.
In-court testimony by an identifying witness as to a prior identification is
not hearsay evidence under Missouri case law.20 In State v. Baldwin,21 the
Missouri Supreme Court held such evidence to be hearsay and inadmissible to
bolster unimpeached testimony.22 However, in State v. Buschman, 3 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court distinguished Baldwin, holding that testimony by an
identifying witness that he or she had previously seen or recognized the defen-
dant was admissible. The Buschman court emphasized that the witness did not
testify that he communicated to anyone by an overt act, such as pointing, that
he recognized the suspect. 4 The recognition testimony referred to the witness'
own mental processes and thus was not a hearsay declaration.2"
Later Missouri cases rejected Baldwin and seemed implicitly to reject the
"recognition" versus "identification" distinction.26 These cases placed empha-
sis on who was testifying at trial. Identifying witnesses were allowed to testify
about prior "identifications" rather than simply "recognitions."
15. Id. at 241.
16. 653 S.W.2d at 230.
17. Id. at 234.
18. Id. Testimony of this type by a third party will be referred to hereinafter as
"corroborating testimony" and that by the identifier will be labelled testimony by the
"identifying witness," although both types tend to corroborate the earlier identification.
19. Id. at 231.
20. E.g., State v. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1980) (en bane); State v.
O'Toole, 520 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1975).
21. 317 Mo. 759, 297 S.W. 10 (1927) (en banc).
22. Id. at 775, 297 S.W. at 15.
23. 325 Mo. 553, 29 S.W.2d 688 (1930).
24. Id. at 559, 29 S.W.2d at 691.
25. Id. at 560, 29 S.W.2d at 691. The cburt apparently defined "recognition" to
mean actual recollection of appearance in the witness' memory and "identification" as
the overt communication of the fact of recognition to another person. See also State v.
DePoortere, 303 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Mo. 1957) (retaining the "recognition" versus
"identification" distinction).
26. See, e.g., State v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo. 1966) (identifying witness
allowed to testify about prior identification from stack of photographs); State v. Rima,
395 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (Mo. 1965) (en banc) (identifying witness allowed to testify
about prior identifications from both lineup and police mug shots).
1985]
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In State v. Degraffenreid,27 the Missouri Supreme Court attempted to
clarify this issue. An identifying witness was allowed to testify concerning
prior identifications both from a lineup and police "mug shots."'28 However,
corroborating testimony was impermissible hearsay evidence. 29 Recent Mis-
souri cases adhere to this distinction because an identifying witness should be
able to testify about a fact personally known even if the fact involves an overt
identification. 0
Mayhue next contended that the videotaped identification should be
treated as corroborating hearsay testimony under Degraffenreid.31 Mayhue
claimed that the tape differed from live testimony in that it involved a reenact-
ment of the circumstances surrounding the identification process and was not
subject to cross-examination.32 The Mayhue court concluded that videotaped
identification was in the nature of direct adoptive testimony by the identifying
witness. Further, the identifying witness was available at trial for cross-exami-
nation regarding both the videotaped and in-court identifications. 33
Other jurisdictions are split as to whether testimony by identifying or cor-
roborating witnesses concerning prior identifications is admissible.34 The fed-
27. 477 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
28. Id. at 59. The court made some confusing statements which seemed to re-
vive the "recognition" versus "identification" distinction. The court indicated that an
identification communicates a declaratory statement either audibly or visually (e.g., by
a pointed finger). Id. at 63. The court also emphasized that the principal issue was
whether the accused was the person seen committing the crime and not whether the
accused had been previously identified. Id. at 64.
29. The probative value of this evidence was considered minimal because it re-
lated only to the fact of identification. Further, the testimony was highly prejudicial as
lending credibility to the identifying witness. The Degraffenreid court reversed the con-
viction due to the improper corroborating testimony even though the identifying witness
was subject to cross-examination at trial. Id. at 34.
30. E.g., State v. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); State v.
O'Toole, 520 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1975). This reasoning has the ad-
vantage of explaining why an identifying witness is permitted to testify about a prior
identification. However, under this rationale, a declarant would be allowed to testify
concerning any prior communication personally made. Most such statements are con-
sidered hearsay and cumulative. See infra note 36.
31. 653 S.W.2d at 233. The courts in Quinn and O'Toole neither discussed nor
disputed the Degraffenreid holding that corroborating testimony was improper.
32. Id. at 233-34.
33. Id. at 233.
34. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967); People v. Gardner,
402 Mich. 460, 484-85, 265 N.W.2d 1, 10 (1978) (identifying witness testimony ad-
missible under Michigan counterpart to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(4) and corroborating
testimony admissible if limited to circumstances surrounding identification); Annot., 71
A.L.R.2d 449 (1960). The Supreme Court has deliberately left this question open
while resolving sixth amendment and fourteenth amendment due process issues. The
Court, however, has refused to prohibit all pretrial identifications from photographs.
See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
In Gilbert (decided the same day as United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)),
the Court held that both in-court and prior identifications were per se excludable if
[Vol. 50
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eral rule quite clearly states that live testimony by the identifying witness
about a prior identification is not hearsay.35 The primary reason for allowing
such testimony is that prior extrajudicial identifications are generally more
reliable than in-court identifications. 6
Although state courts are split on whether this evidence is hearsay, the
tainted by a post-indictment lineup violating the sixth amendment right to counsel. 388
U.S. at 272-73. The Court did not distinguish between testimony by identifying and
corroborating witnesses. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972), the Court re-
fused to label a pre-indictment lineup as a critical stage entitled to sixth amendment
protection.
In Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), the Court decided whether the per se
exclusionary rule or totality of circumstances test should be applied when prior identifi-
cation evidence was impermissibly suggestive by fourteenth amendment due process
standards. The Court concluded that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the ad-
missibility" of extrajudicial identifications and then considered all relevant facts. Id. at
114. By implication, the Supreme Court suggests that the hearsay rule is an inappro-
priate vehicle for protection against unreliable extrajudicial identifications. See J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE, COMMENTARY ON RULES OF Evi-
DENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS § 801(d)(1)(C), at
173 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE]; Weinstein, Alterna-
tives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 384 n.14 (1968).
35. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C) defines a prior statement by a witness as
nonhearsay if: "The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement and the statement is. . . one of identification of
a person made after perceiving him."
36. The original unpublished draft of the federal advisory committee classified
all prior statements by a witness subject to cross-examination at trial as nonhearsay.
Congress rejected this position and required specific limitations on the types of state-
ments to be treated this way. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1), at
100 and 169. Admitting most kinds of prior consistent statements would be cumber-
some and valueless. J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1130 at
277 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Further, cross-examination at trial is generally not an ade-
quate substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination.
Thus, the adopted federal rule recognized that the general rule is exclusion, but
particular circumstances call for a contrary result. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) advisory
committee note. Prior identification testimony is special in that it is generally more
reliable than in-court identification. J. WIGMORE supra, § 1130, at 277. Professor Wig-
more contends that in-court identifications have very little probative value due to cir-
cumstances at trial, and prior identifications are usually less suggestive. Id. Procedural
irregularities at the lineup can certainly destroy this advantage. See P. WALL, EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 76-77 (1965).
Prior identifications are also nearer in time to the crime, which alleviates problems
with changes in the suspect's appearance and the witness' memory during the period
before trial. E.g., People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 488, 265 N.W.2d 1, 10 (1978).
Interestingly, the original rule of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court required
that the prior identification be made "soon" after perception, but this requirement was
dropped on recommendation of the Department of Justice. J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
AND FOR STATE COURTS § 801(d)(1)(C), at 125 (1981).
Finally, videotaped prior identifications arguably have even greater probative value
because circumstances are recorded and need not be recreated from memory through
oral testimony.
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recent trend is to admit prior identification as substantive evidence if the iden-
tifying witness is available for cross-examination. 37 Arizona, Florida, and
Michigan, for example, have adopted the federal rule.38 Hawaii treats prior
identification as an exception to the hearsay rule.39 Minnesota and Maryland
require additional indicia of reliability before the evidence will be admitted. 0
New York courts treat prior identification as nonhearsay but exclude the evi-
dence if the identification was made from photographs. 41 Other courts have
simply refused to apply the hearsay rule without explanation."'
These courts recognize that the hearsay rule is designed to protect against
the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination. For prior identification testi-
mony, cross-examination generally does not attack the identification itself.
Rather, procedural improprieties are the primary concern. Because the identi-
fying witness can be cross-examined at trial regarding procedures, this hazard
is obviated.' 3
37. See, e.g., State v. Villegas, 101 Ariz. 465, 420 P.2d 940 (1966); People v.
Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960); Carter v. State, 266
Ind. 196, 200-01, 361 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (1977).
38. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 801(d)(1)(C) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.801 (West 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 801(d)(1) (Callaghan 1980).
39. HAWAII R. EvID. § 802.1(3) (1980).
40. Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 444, 199 A.2d 773, 779 (1964) (admitting
both photographic and corporeal pretrial identification evidence under reliable circum-
stances); 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. EvID. § 801(d)(1)(C) (West 1980). For other state
adaptations, see WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1)(c), at 179-84.
41. New York courts limit prior identifications from photographs on due pro-
cess grounds. Selection from mug shots is especially troublesome because it leads to an
inference that the defendant has had previous trouble with the police. E.g., People v.
Whipset, 80 A.D.2d 986, 987, 437 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (1981); People v. McKenna, 77
A.D.2d 926, 927, 431 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101-02 (1980). Positive in-court identification,
however, can make testimony concerning a prior identification harmless error. People v.
Ortiz, 65 A.D.2d 607, 607, 409 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (1978).
42. See People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 494 n.1, 265 N.W.2d 1, 14 n.1
(1978) (Ryan, J., concurring). Justice Ryan, citing People v. Londe, 230 Mich. 484,
203 N.W. 93 (1925), and People v. Hallaway, 389 Mich. 265, 275-76, 205 N.W.2d
451, 454 (1973), notes that prior identification statements traditionally have been ex-
cluded as hearsay and cumulative, but several courts have summarily allowed such
evidence without discussing these issues. Gardner, 402 Mich. at 494 n.1, 265 N.W.2d
at 14 n.l.
43. See People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 487-88 & n.3, 265 N.W.2d 1, 11 &
n.4 (1978). Most prior consistent statements made by a declarant available for cross-
examination at trial are still inadmissible. See supra note 36. However, testimony con-
cerning the substantive identification itself is "a simple yes or no proposition" rather
than "narration of a complex event" where cross-examination on details is vital. P.
WALL, supra note 36, at 135. The true purpose of cross-examination in such a case is
to determine the suggestiveness of procedures and is not (as would normally be the
case) to attack the statement's veracity. Id. at 135-36. The identifying witness' memory
concerning procedural details can be boosted by taking all available third party testi-
mony at a pretrial "Wade" hearing to determine improprieties. When the procedures
are recorded on videotape, memory of details becomes completely unnecessary. Thus,
cross-examination at trial becomes an adequate substitute for contemporaneous cross-
[Vol. 50
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Other jurisdictions are also divided on whether corroborating testimony is
hearsay. The federal rule has been interpreted to allow such evidence when the
identifying witness testifies at trial."' Some state courts also have admitted
corroborating evidence.45
The Mayhue court probably reached the correct result on the hearsay
issue under Missouri law. Videotaped evidence should be bifurcated into its
component audio and visual aspects. Foundational prerequisites to admission
should be the same for videotapes as for other types of audio and visual de-
monstrative evidence.46 The sound can be turned down or the video blacked
out if one part is admissible but the other is not.
A prior identification, whether audio or visual, should be admissible under
the hearsay rule. Missouri case law traditionally stressed the "recognition"
versus "identification" distinction. 47 This concern was justifiable since histori-
cally an overt implicit or explicit declaration of the suspect's identity has been
treated as hearsay.48 Until the identifying witness communicates the "recogni-
examination. See id.; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1)(C) at 127-
28; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 177, 196 (1948).
44. E.g., United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1981) (permitting
F.B.I. agent testimony when identifying witness also.testified); United States v. Cueto,
611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (corroborating testimony not hearsay, but original
identification from only one photograph violated due process); United States v. Fritz,
580 F.2d 370, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (allowing police officer to testify
about fellow officer's statement remembering suspect from prior case), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 947 (1978); cf. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1)(C), at 177
(constitutional standards for meaningful confrontation and trial judge discretion pro-
vide safeguards for reliability of third party testimony when identifying witness does
not testify at trial or cannot remember).
45. See, e.g., Kellensworth v. State, 633 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ark. 1983) (allowed
police officer testimony about prosecutrix's prior identification); People v. Turner, 116
Mich. App. 421, 424, 323 N.W.2d 425, 426 (1982) (corroborating testimony as to
circumstances surrounding identification including fact of identification not hearsay).
But see Lyles v. State, 412 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversible error
to allow police officer to testify about prior identification by defendant's four year old
daughter in sexual battery case when identifying witness did not testify at trial); People
v. Price, 112 Mich. App. 791, 803, 317 N.W.2d 249, 255 (1982) (corroborating testi-
mony hearsay, but harmless error).
46. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
48. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committe note. The committee uses the
act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup as an example of a nonverbal assertive
statement. The oral declaration of numbers assigned to the suspects in Mayhue, see
supra note 8, should be treated similarly.
However, the statement is arguably a mere operative fact if the witness does not
testify as to the truth of the identification, but only to the fact that it was made and the
surrounding circumstances. The statement will not be admitted for substantive pur-
poses, but it will serve the related purpose of bolstering the credibility of the in-court
identification. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1)(c), at 176; cf.
People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 491, 265 N.W.2d 1, 13 (1978) (third party who
witnessed the extrajudicial identification allowed to testify only about the circum-
1985]
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tion," the fact is retained in his or her memory, so there is no statement or
hearsay problem. Once the "recognition" is communicated to a third party,
traditional hearsay problems arise.
A closely related but distinct issue important to Missouri courts has been
the source of the testimony. An identifying witness may testify about a prior
overt identification while a corroborating witness cannot.49 The Mayhue court
avoided the hearsay problem by labelling the evidence as merely "adoptive"
testimony.50 This apparently follows recent Missouri cases suggesting that the
identification is merely a fact within the personal knowledge of the identifying
witness. 51 The problem with this theory is that not all prior consistent state-
ments by a declarant now subject to cross-examination are treated as
nonhearsay.52
The Mayhue court analogized the videotaped identification to testimony
by the identifying witness rather than corroborating testimony.5 3 This distinc-
tion is important in some jurisdictions. A theory, not discussed by the court,
supporting this view is that the overt act of identification is captured and pre-
served for later communication directly to the jury.54 Although there are some
problems with this treatment,5 5 it appears to be preferable.
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions tend to admit prior identification
testimony due to its generally superior reliability to in-court identification.
5 6
These jurisdictions either ignore conceptual hearsay problems, define the evi-
dence as nonhearsay, or treat the testimony as a hearsay exception. 57 The last
two approaches present the best solution to the problem due to divergence
from traditional hearsay concepts.
The hearsay rule is not a talismanic vehicle for excluding all unreliable
evidence. When prior identifications are less reliable than in-court identifica-
stances surrounding the identification). If this rationale is accepted, there probably
should be less justification for distinguishing between testimony by identifying and cor-
roborating witnesses. See infra note 83.
49. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
50. 653 S.W.2d at 233.
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 35, 43 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
54. Thus, there is no need to rely on the credibility of third parties. For exam-
ple, if the videotape machine were automatically set and everyone except the identify-
ing witness left the room, there would be no communication of the identifying act until
the tape was later played.
55. There are two problems with treating the tape as testimony by the identify-
ing witness. First, the Mayhue court deleted other oral statements on the tape on hear-
say grounds. See supra note 8. These statements would also not have been communi-
cated until a later time if no third parties had been present at the recording stage.
Second, an equally strong argument can be made that the videotape itself serves as a
corroborating witness. There are merely fewer difficulties in proving veracity due to the
mechanical nature of recording and preserving the statement.
56. See supra notes 37, 43 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
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tions, constitutional limitations and trial judge discretion provide adequate
safeguards. First, due process protects against impermissibly suggestive proce-
dures. Second, the sixth amendment is an appropriate mechanism for denying
the admission of unreliable corroborating testimony.58 Finally, the trial judge
has discretion to exclude unreliable evidence."
Appellant Mayhue also contended that the videotaped evidence was cu-
mulative as a prior consistent statement.60 The Mayhue court rejected this
argument for several reasons. Although appellant did not cross-examine the
witness at trial to impeach her credibility, he pleaded not guilty to the multi-
ple charges, including assault. The prosecution had the burden of proving the
victim's injury under that charge. Because the tape depicted Super's wounds,
it was not cumulative.6 ' Second, the videotape had additional probative value
for the limited issue concerning certainty of identification. 62 Finally, cumula-
tive evidence of verbal identification is not prejudicial error under Missouri
law.63
Missouri case law is relatively clear on the cumulative evidence issue. In
Baldwin, the Missouri Supreme Court held that an extrajudicial identification
was inadmissible because witness credibility cannot be bolstered until as-
sailed.84 However, in Buschman, the court held that this evidence was not cu-
mulative because the prior recognition merely proved facts enabling the jury
to better weigh the value of the in-court identification. 5
In Degraffenreid, the Missouri Supreme Court attempted to clarify this
issue. Corroborating testimony, unlike testimony by the identifying witness,
was held to be cumulative.66 The court noted that testimony by a third party
about a prior identification certainly lends credence to the in-court identifica-
58. See supra notes 34, 44 and accompanying text.
59. See FED. R. EVID. 402; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 34,
801(d)(1)(c), at 178.
60. 653 S.W.2d at 233. Mayhue offered no evidence contradicting the identifi-
cation testimony and claimed that rehabilitation of the witness was unnecessary, since
she had not been impeached. Id. at 230.
61. Id. at 235-36.
62. Id. at 233. The Mayhue court emphasized the fact that the tape was admis-
sible to show Super's demeanor and unconditional identification rather than the fact of
identification itself. This argument would be more persuasive if the tape focused on
Super's face during the identifying act, rather than directly focusing on her only briefly
at the end of the tape. See supra note 9.
63. Id. at 234; see State v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Mo. 1972); State v.
Williams, 448 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. 1970).
64. 317 Mo. 759, 779, 297 S.W. 10, 16 (1927) (en banc) (overruled in State v.
Rima, 395 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1965) (en banc)).
65. 325 Mo. 553, 560, 29 S.W.2d 688, 692 (1930). The Buschman court rea-
soned that prior visual contacts with the suspect are relevant because the initial impres-
sion in the witness' memory is enhanced by later contact. Thus, they add credibility
and reliability to the in-court identification. Id.; see also State v. DePoortere, 303
S.W.2d 920, 924 (Mo. 1957) (confirming Buschman rationale).
66. 477 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
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tion, 7 but it does so in a somewhat different manner than testimony by the
identifying witness. 68
In State v. O'Toole,"9 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the St. Louis
District held that testimony by an identifying witness was not improper be-
cause it was "direct testimony of the witness himself," as opposed to corrobo-
ration from a third person.7 0 This reasoning was approved by the Missouri
Supreme Court in State v. Quinn.7 1
The federal rule regarding the issue of cumulative testimony is clear.7 2
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) was designed to permit as substantive tes-
timony certain types of prior statements by a witness.7 3 Paragraphs (B) and
(C) specifically allow types of prior consistent statements which traditionally
have been regarded as hearsay and cumulative.7 4 The rule admitting prior
identification evidence does not distinguish between testimony by a corroborat-
ing witness and that by an identifying witness, so long as the identifying wit-
ness is available for trial and subject to cross-examination.7 5
Other jurisdictions are split as to whether prior identifications are exclud-
able as cumulative. The traditional rule is that prior consistent statements can-
67. Judge Holman argued that cumulative testimony was not prejudicial when
the in-court testimony was undisputed. Id. at 65 (Holman, J., dissenting). The majority
rejected this position because acceptance of the harmless error argument would indi-
rectly abolish all rules against bolstering unimpeached witnesses. Id. at 64.
68. The Degraffenreid court relied on two factors to explain why the source of
the testimony is important to this issue. First, the court emphasized the fact that the
corroborating witness could only be cross-examined concerning the prior identification
and not whether the suspect was the person seen committing the crime. Second, the
court explained that corroborating testimony lends additional credence to the identifi-
cation primarily due to the stature and character of the third party witness. Id. at 64.
69. 520 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1975).
70. Id. at 180.
71. 594 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
72. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1)(C). See generally supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text.
73. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee note; see also WEINSTEIN'S Evi-
DENCE, supra note 34, § 801(d)(1), at 100-01.
74. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(B) defines a prior consistent statement as nonhear-
say if "offered to rebut an express or implied charge . . . of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive."
75. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. However, the recording aspect
may affect the federal rule regarding cumulative evidence. Compare United States v.
Papia, 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977) (admitting tape recorded conversations because
not like other prior consistent statements) with United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to allow prior consistent tape recorded statements
when in-court testimony not attacked as recent fabrication), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977).
Another jurisdiction has also recognized the unique nature of recorded evidence.
See Grier v. United States, 381 A.2d 3, 4 (D.C. 1977) (dictum) (previous written or
recorded statements not valueless although entirely consistent with testimony since
more reliable and more emphatic).
[Vol. 50
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not be introduced absent impeachment.76 However, courts that treat prior
identifications as nonhearsay tend to admit the evidence over cumulative ob-
jections for the same reasons.17
The Mayhue court was probably correct in holding the videotaped evi-
dence was noncumulative under Missouri law. One rationale cited by the court
was that prior identification is not impermissible bolstering because it is "di-
rect testimony by the witness himself. '7' As previously discussed, the difficulty
is that not all prior consistent statements by a witness available for cross-ex-
amination are admissible. 9 Another rationale used by the court was that the
visual segment was relevant to the injury element in the assault charge."0
However, a problem arises because the entire tape was offered and admitted
expressly for the limited purpose of proving certainty of identification. A
third reason relied on by the court was that the tape had probative value be-
cause it demonstrated certainty of identification. 2 This explanation is prob-
lematic because it is difficult to distinguish testimony by identifying and cor-
roborating witnesses under the rationale of Buschman.8 3
Federal courts and recent cases from other jurisdictions recognize that the
normal rules against admitting prior consistent statements should defer to the
necessary and desirable evidence of prior identification.84 Like the hearsay
rule, inflexible cumulative evidence rules serve no useful purpose by excluding
such evidence.
Mayhue further contended that the videotaped identification was prejudi-
76. E.g., Commonwealth v. Darden, 5 Mass. App. 522, _, 364 N.E.2d 1092,
1096 (1977); Newton v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 400, 404, 180 S.W.2d 946, 949-50
(1944); see also J. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE 102-03 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
77. E.g., Kellensworth v. State, 276 Ark. 127, 129-30, 633 S.W.2d 21, 23
(1982); Carter v. State, 266 Ind. 196, 198, 361 N.E.2d 1208, 1209 (1977) (declarant
available at trial for cross-examination and assessment of demeanor), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 866 (1977); People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 489, 265 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1978)
(special type of prior consistent statement and should not require impeachment); Fells
v. State, 345 So. 2d 618, 621 (Miss. 1977) (need and reliability).
78. 653 S.W.2d at 235; see supra text accompanying note 70.
79. See supra note 36. The Mayhue court implicitly recognized this by exclud-
ing other oral statements on the tape. See supra note 8.
80. 653 S.W.2d at 236.
81. Id. at 232-33; see infra note 100.
82. 653 S.W.2d at 233.
83. 325 Mo. 553, 29 S.W.2d 688 (1930). Any testimony concerning prior iden-
tification, regardless of who delivers it, will lend credibility to the in-court identification
under the Buschman rationale. The presumed enhanced impression left in the memory
of the identifying witness is due to prior contact, rather than the identity of the person
testifying about the prior contact.
The Degraffenreid reasoning is perhaps more persuasive. See supra note 68. How-
ever, an argument can be made that corroborating testimony is less convincing because
jurors are required to trust the characters of both the identifying witness and the third
party.
84. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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cial and inflammatory.8 5 Mayhue claimed that the video portion was highly
prejudicial because it emphasized the gruesome wounds of the victim. Mayhue
also argued that even if the evidence was not hearsay or technically cumula-
tive, its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.86
The Mayhue court denied both assertions. The gruesomeness of the tape
was due to the gruesomeness of the crime, and such evidence was admissible
in the discretion of the trial judge if relevant to any material issue in the
case. 1 The grotesque visual display was material to the nature and extent of
the victim's injury under the assault charge for which the prosecution had the
burden of proof.88 Further, the weighing of probative value versus prejudicial
effect was within the discretion of the trial judge.8 '
Missouri law on this subject is quite clear. Discretion is not "abused if
visual demonstration of gruesome injuries is relevant to any material issue in
the case, and the evidence accurately depicts the physical appearance of the
victim. 0 Emotional impact relates only to the weight of the evidence and not
admissibility.9 ' The use of close-ups does not necessarily mean that the evi-
dence was displayed in an unduly inflammatory manner.92 Further, a photo-
graph is superior to words as a description of injuries and thus not necessarily
cumulative when an in-court verbal description is given.93
The federal rule on the exclusion of prejudicial evidence is contained in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.94 Relevant evidence can be excluded if proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by prejudicial impact and other factors.
85. 653 S.W.2d at 230.
86. Id. at 235.
87. Id. at 236.
88. Id. at 236. The victim testified in court as to the nature and location of her
wounds, so Mayhue argued that the visual display was unnecessary to establish the
injury element. Id. at 235; see also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
89. 653 S.W.2d at 236.
90. E.g., State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Mo. 1980) (photograph show-
ing victim shot three times admissible to prove cause of death and malice); State v.
Jones, 515 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. 1974) (photograph showing gunshot wound in head
admissible to prove nature and extent of injuries). But cf. State v. Floyd, 360 S.W.2d
630, 633 (Mo. 1962) (photograph of badly decomposed body not admissible when im-
possible to determine nature of wounds or cause of death).
91. E.g., State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1974) (allowed convincing and
damaging videotaped confession); State v. Hamell, 561 S&W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. App.,
St. L.D. 1977) (videotaped confession).
92. E.g., State v. Hudson, 521 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1975) (al-
lowed repeated videotaped closeups of shotgun used to kill baby).
93. See, e.g., State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Mo. 1980); Holtkamp v.
State, 588 S.W.2d 183, 189-90 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (admitted photographs showing
defendant's wife's dead body chained with concrete blocks and pulled from creek be-
cause no more gruesome than oral testimony); cf. supra note 75 (tape recordings).
94. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
[Vol. 50
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/10
1985] VIDEOTAPED IDENTIFICATION 169
The advisory committee noted that this discretionary balancing process is con-
ducted by the trial judge.9" If visually gruesome evidence is relevant to a mate-
rial issue in the case, its admission is generally not reversible error.9 6
Other jurisdictions have admitted visually inflammatory evidence when
relevant to a material issue in the case. 7 For example, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that a videotaped deposition of a severely injured witness in a hospi-
tal wheelchair was admissible.98
The Mayhue court correctly held that visually gruesome evidence is ad-
missible in the discretion of the trial judge to prove any material issue in the
case. The court relied heavily on the fact that the video portion was admissible
to show injury.99 The trial judge, however, might have committed reversible
error since admission of the entire tape was expressly limited to the issue of
certainty of identification. 100 Nevertheless, the evidence might be admissible as
95. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee note. The committee said that
the effectiveness of a limiting instruction should be considered in this analysis. Id.
Mayhue declined a jury instruction offered by the prosecution to limit the tape to the
issue of certainty of identification. 653 S.W.2d at 235.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1981)
(color photograph depicting child's lacerated heart admissible to prove cruel and exces-
sive force); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 223 (6th Cir. 1981) (color autopsy slides show-
ing dissected intimate parts of nine-year old girl admissible to prove penetration in rape
charge), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1035 (1981); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d
561, 564 (10th Cir. 1976) (photograph of nude rape and murder victim admissible to
prove cause of death), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
97. E.g., State v. Rife, 215 Neb. 132, 142-44, 337 N.W.2d 724, 730-31 (1983)
(videotape and photos depicting brutally murdered victim's crushed face admissible to
prove condition of body, cause of death, and malice), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 977
(1984); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (photographs of
exhumed bodies admissible to show manner in which victims were bound and killed),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
98. State v. Jackson, 259 N.W.2d 796, 798-99 (Iowa 1977). The witness had a
gunshot wound, had both arms in slings, and wore a cervical collar. Id. at 798. The
court held that videotaped evidence should not be rejected merely because of its po-
tency or forceful demonstration. Id. at 799; see also French v. State, 271 Ark. 445,
448, 609 S.W.2d 42, 44 (1980) (videotape showing grandfather performing various
sexual acts on young granddaughter admissible); State v. Ahlo, 2 Haw. App. 462, ,
634 P.2d 421, 425 (1981) (videotape showing badly decomposed body admissible to
prove cause of death), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 981 (1982); Payne v. Commonwealth, 623
S.W.2d 867, 877-78 (Ky. 1981) (videotape showing perverse sexual acts being per-
formed on young boys admissible to prove design), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982).
99. 653 S.W.2d at 236; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
100. The Mayhue court could have reversed the case on the issue of prejudice.
The problem was that the evidence was expressly offered and admitted for the limited
purpose of proving certainty of identification. 653 S.W.2d at 232-33.
The videotape should be treated as bifurcated. The audio portion is relevant solely
to identification. The video portion is relevant to the injury element in the assault
charge. The Mayhue court relied heavily on the latter fact. However, the evidentiary
purpose of the entire tape was expressly limited. This limitation should have effectively
excluded the probative value for the injury element from any bearing on the prejudicial
balancing analysis. The visual portion possibly should have been severed and struck.
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a prior identification demonstrating a fair and accurate depiction of circum-
stances at the time of identification. 101
Mayhue made two contentions as to the use of videotaped evidence in
general. First, lie claimed that videotaped evidence is inherently prejudicial
due to the emotional impact on jurors.10 2 Second, Mayhue argued that, for
evidentiary purposes, videotapes should be treated differently than photo-
graphs due to dramatic appeal.103
The Mayhue court denied that videotapes are inherently prejudicial, not-
ing that modern society exposes persons to visual aids, including videotapes, so
often that there is no merit to the claim that they have special appeal. Further,
the tape did not automatically favor the prosecution because it was equally
plausible that uncertainty in identification could have been demonstrated. 04
Finally, the court held that videotapes should be considered by the same ad-
missibility standards as photographs.105
Missouri courts have approved the use of videotaped evidence, stating
that there is nothing inherently prejudicial about this medium.106 Videotaped
confessions have often been admitted.10 7 Missouri courts have also held that
videotapes are admissible according to the same rules as other demonstrative
evidence. 08 Further, the Missouri legislature has expressly authorized the use
If Mayhue had stipulated or offered to stipulate the injury or identification ele-
ment, the effect would be uncertain. The evidence would probably still be admissible.
See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 592 S.W.2d 727, 730-31 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (defendant's
gun admissible to negate claim of peaceful disposition despite stipulation that it was
murder weapon).
101. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972).
102. 653 S.W.2d at 233.
103. Id. at 231.
104. Id. at 233. The court noted, without deciding, that the defendant probably
should be given the right through some sort of discovery to use the tape as evidence
should it prove exculpatory. Id. at 234 n.4.
105. Id. at 236. The court stated that videotapes are a recognized form of com-
munication and permissible means of presenting evidence in modern society. Further,
the court saw no reason to cast doubt on the veracity of videotapes in general or the
specific tapes used in this case. Thus, no additional admissibility requirement was im-
posed. Id.
For foundational requirements and admissibility standards for photographs and
demonstrative evidence, see G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
416-25 (1978).
106. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (allowed
videotaped confession); State v. Green, 603 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (al-
lowed videotape of illegal fencing operations); State v. Hamell, 561 S.W.2d 357, 361
(Mo. App., St. L.D. 1977) (allowed videotaped confession).
107. See, e.g., State v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1970); State v. Lusk,
452 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. 1970). Mayhue's confession was videotaped and displayed
to the jury, but this point was not argued on appeal. 653 S.W.2d at 230.
108. E.g., State v. Hudson, 521 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1975); see
also supra note 105.
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of videotapes in two settings. 09
Other jurisdictions have increasingly approved the use of videotaped evi-
dence in a variety of criminal contexts.11 0 One controversial area is the use of
videotaped depositions in criminal cases.' There is some authority that pres-
entation of the deposition violates the sixth amendment right to confrontation,
unless an affirmative showing of unavailability is made."
2
Another controversial context where courts are divided involves video-
taped reenactment of crimes."" Recently, the Texas Court of Appeals held
admission of such evidence to constitute reversible error since videotaped reen-
actments are posed, inaccurate, and misleading to jurors."" The Texas court
argued that this evidence should be excluded when events are easy to under-
stand and testimony is sufficient."15
The Mayhue court correctly held that videotapes are not inherently preju-
109. The Missouri legislature has expressly authorized videotaped depositions for
"essential" witnesses in criminal cases, and this evidence is admissible to the same
extent as any criminal deposition. Mo. REv. STAT. § 492.303 (Supp. 1985). The legisla-
ture has also authorized an assigning circuit judge to require an associate circuit judge
to preserve the record for appeal by using video recording devices. Id. § 478.072. Pre-
serving testimony by videotape may have the unintentional side effect of broadening the
scope of review.
110. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (interroga-
tion and confessions); People v. Fenelon, 14 Ill. App. 3d 622, 303 N.E.2d 38 (1973)
(driver's condition when charged with driving under influence of alcohol); People v.
Mines, 132 11. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971) (crime scene); People v. Heading,
39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325 (1972) (lineup); State v. Johnson, 18 N.C. App.
606, 197 S.E.2d 592 (1973) (crime being committed).
111. See, e.g., People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 405-11, 114 Cal. Rptr.
413, 416-21 (1974) (videotape of preliminary hearing testimony allowed where chief
witness died during trial).
112. Cf. State v. Gettys, 49 Ohio App. 2d 241, 249, 360 N.E.2d 735, 740-41
(1976) (applying Ohio Constitution provision similar to sixth amendment). The Florida
Court of Appeals has stated that the right to confrontation is satisfied if the witness is
unavailable. Otherwise, the same right would always be violated when transcribed testi-
mony is read in court. Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1974). A New York lower court has stated
that the right to confrontation is violated if a videotaped deposition is introduced at
trial without the testimony of the identifying witness. People v. Higgins, 89 Misc. 2d
913, 916, 392 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (dictum).
113. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 241 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1970) (allowed motion
picture reenactment); Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 363-65 (Fla. 1965) (allowed
motion picture reenactment), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1014 (1966). But see Peterson v.
State, 586 P.2d 144, 154-55 (Wyo. 1978) (not abuse of discretion for trial judge to
exclude videotaped reenactment when adequate trial testimony exists); J. WIGMORE,
supra note 36, at § 798a (advising against permitting videotaped reenctments because
artificial reconstruction of events misleads jurors due to errors).
114. Lopez v. State, 651 S.W.2d 413, 414-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), remanded
per curiam on other grounds, 664 S.W.2d. 85 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), withdrawn
on other grounds, 667 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
115. Id. at 415 (citing Eiland v. State, 130 Ga. App. 428, 429, 203 S.E.2d 619,
621 (1973)).
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dicial. Missouri courts, the Missouri legislature, and courts in other jurisdic-
tions have approved their use in a variety of contexts.11 6 The admissibility of
the evidence should be considered separately for its video and audio compo-
nents. Foundational requirements for the introduction of the evidence should
be the same as for other types of demonstrative evidence. 117
Many reasons have been suggested for the use of videotaped evidence.
First, videotaping confessions may actually protect the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.11" Second, videotaped depositions are more interesting and may
hold jurors' attentions better than the reading of stenographic reports. 19
Third, videotapes enable jurors to better assess demeanor and credibility of
witnesses.1 2 0 Fourth, videotapes better preserve evidence for appellate re-
view.' 21 Fifth, videotaped lineups may aid in determining whether the proce-
dures have met constitutional criteria . 22 Lastly, videotaped prior identifica-
tions may show hesitation or uncertainty and thus prove exculpatory for a
criminal defendant.1 23
Mayhue has significant implications for the expanded use of videotapes in
criminal trials.12 4 First, as a practical matter, all lineups in the future should
be videotaped showing both the procedures employed and the identifying wit-
ness' facial expression, physical appearance, and gestures. Videotaping is rela-
116. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
117. See People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 132, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329
(1972) (since videotape is combination of sound and video recordings, foundational re-
quirements for both must be satisfied); see also supra note 105.
118. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972). The court men-
tioned that if the videotape depicts the suspect as faltering, worn out by interrogation,
physically abused, or in other ways acting involuntarily, then the tape protects the de-
fendant's right against self-incrimination. Id.
119. Cf. Miller, Bender, Boster, Florence, Fontes, Hocking & Nicholson, The
Effects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials: Studies on Juror Decision Making,
Information Retention, and Emotional Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 331, 358 (com-
parison of live testimony with videotaped testimony).
120. Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
121. E.g., Cunningham, Videotape Evidence: Technological Innovation in the
Trial Process, 36 ALA. LAWYER 228, 239 (1975); Short, Florence & Marsh, An As-
sessment of Videotape in the Criminal Courts, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 453-54; see
also supra note 109.
122. 653 S.W.2d at 234. A "totality of the circumstances" test is used to deter-
mine whether procedures are impermissibly suggestive. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199 (1972); see also supra note 34.
123. See supra text accompanying note 104. For a more detailed analysis of ad-
vantages and disadvantages of videotaped evidence, see Barber, Videotape in Criminal
Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1974); Cunningham, supra note 121; The Use of
Videotape in the Courtroom, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 327.
124. The United States Department of Justice Project Staff undertook a compre-
hensive study to determine the feasibility of implementing expanded uses of videotapes
in criminal trials. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, VIDEO SUPPORT IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
(1975). The study generally recommended further applications of such evidence. Id. at
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tively inexpensive and should be easily accessible to prosecutors and police
officers. The videotape is a strong medium to dramatically enhance presenta-
tion of the case.125
Videotaped evidence has many unique advantages. Courts are likely to
approve its expanded, use in the future. Evidentiary objections to videotapes
should be considered separately for the audio and visual aspects of the tape.
Foundational requirements should be similar to other types of demonstrative
evidence. If either component is inadmissible, the sound can be turned down or
the video blacked out to preserve the admissible portion.
Videotapes of the criminal identification process generally should be ad-
missible. Oral statements or nonverbal assertions of identification should with-
stand hearsay and cumulative objections because prior identification is gener-
ally more reliable than in-court identification. The visual portion should not be
excluded on prejudice grounds merely due to its gruesome nature so long as
the visual display is relevant to any material issue in the case. Generally, if the
witness appears gruesome, the tape is admissible to prove the nature and loca-
tion of wounds. Constitutional limitations of due process and the right to con-
frontation provide adequate safeguards against the primary concern of imper-
missibly suggestive procedures in the criminal identification process.
KARL F. FINDORFF
125. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 508-09 (1972) (Heaney, J., dis-
senting); M. MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 125 (1967). Mayhue leaves
unanswered the question of the extent to which manipulation of camera techniques
such as closeups and angles can dramatically enhance presentation of the case before
the tapes become too prejudicial.
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